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Abstract 
 
This paper takes the incomplete contract and property rights based approach 
to discuss control rights, the Economic Value Added approach and value-
based corporate governance. The aim of the paper is to explore the 
approaches and strategies in order to effectively control and measure value 
added activities at various management levels. A case study of several 
corporate governance systems and Economic Value Added performances of 
the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) in Automobile industry will be 
conducted to provide insight into this topic. 
The main conclusions derived are as follows:  
(1) The division of knowledge assets leads to the separation of ownership and 
control, which induces the agency problem;  
(2) Corporate governance is a complex set of constraints that shape the ex 
post bargaining over the residual claims and residual risk;  
(3) Economic Value Added (EVA) can be used to control and measure value 
creation activities at project, department and firm levels;  
(4) Various corporate governance systems have different roots in its unique 
economic, cultural, legal and political conditions and its own evolution history; 
it is hard to conclude which one is the best;  
(5) The case study shows that many companies are using value based 
corporate governance systems;  
(6) In sense of opportunity cost, Economic Value Added should be sufficient to 
cover both operating and capital costs.  
This approach poses new challenge for managers to set higher value added 
targets than regular accounting ones when they make decisions on 
investment and other value added activities. 
 
Key Words: 
Agency Problem; Control rights; Shareholder Value; Economic Value Added; 
Value-based Corporate Governance 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Meine Magisterarbeit befasst sich mit den Merkmalen des unvollständigen 
Vertrags und führt über Eigentumsrechte zur Diskussion über Kontrollrechte 
und wertorientierte Unternehmensführung. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist es, die 
Ansätze und Strategien zu erkunden, die die Wertschöpfungsaktivitäten auf 
verschiedenen Ebenen - angefangen bei der Projektebene, über 
Abteilungsebene bis hin zur Unternehmensebene - effektiv kontrollieren und 
messen. Eine Fallstudie über diverse  Corporate-Governance-Systeme und 
Leistungen der Economic Value Added (EVA) am Beispiel von 
Automobileherstellern dient als abschließender Praxisbezug. 
Die wichtigsten Schlussfolgerungen sind:  
(1) die Aufteilung der wissensintensiven Vermögenswerten führt zu der 
Trennung von Eigentum und Kontrolle, verursacht durch das Agenturproblem; 
(2) Unternehmensführung ist eine komplexer Umfang von Einschränkungen, 
die durch Ex-post-Verhandlungen restliche Ansprüche sowie das allgemeine 
Restrisiko bestimmen;  
(3) Economic Value Added (EVA) kann zur Steuerung und Messung der 
Wertschöpfungsaktivitäten auf Projekt-, Abteilungs- und Unternehmensebene 
herangezogen werden;  
(4) Ein Vergleich  der verschiedenen Corporate-Governance-Systeme ist 
aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen Entwicklung sehr schwierig und muss stets 
im jeweiligen wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen, rechtlichen und politischen Kontext 
betrachtet werden. 
(5) die Fallstudie zeigt, dass viele Unternehmen wertorientierte  Corporate-
Governance-Systeme nutzen;  
(6) In Bezug auf Opportunitätskosten sollte die Economic Value Added (EVA) 
ausreichen, um sowohl alle Betriebskosten als auch alle Kapitalkosten zu 
decken.  
Dieser Ansatz stellt eine neue Herausforderung für Manager im Bereich der 
Entscheidungsfindung über Investitionen und andere 
Wertschöpfungsaktivitäten dar. Es gilt, höhere Ziele für die Wertschöpfung 
anzusetzen als die, die die normale Rechnungslegungssysteme anbieten.  
Schlagwörter: 
Agenturproblem; Kontrollrechte; Aktionärswert; Geschäftswertbeitrag; 
wertorientierte Corporate Governance 
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Chapter 1 Introduction1 
 
 
 
 
 
The Financial Crisis of 2007–2010 sparks recently a new wave of discussions 
over the corporate governance systems and value-based management in the 
academic areas. The meltdown in the Wall Street resulted in the world 
economy’s descent into the most severe financial crisis after World War II. 
Historically the discussion over corporate governance issues beginned with 
Berle and Means’s 1932 groundbreaking book “The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property”, where they pointed out that the real challenge of corporate 
governance is the separation of ownership and control:  
“(Corporation) involves the integration of a wide diversity of economic 
interests – those of the “owners” who supply capital, those of the 
workers who “create”, those of the consumers who give value to the 
products of enterprise, and above all those of the control who wield 
power…Such a great concentration of power and such a diversity of 
interest raise the long-fight issue of power and its regulation – of 
interest and its protection…”2. 
Actually Adam Smith had already noticed the point: 
“The directors…being the managers rather of other people’s money 
than their own…cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it 
with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartner frequently watch over their own…”3. 
However, only after the appearance of stock markets and modern public 
enterprises, especially after the 1929 Great Depression, did academics began 
to discuss more intensively over the so-called “agency problem”. After Berle 
and Means, many economists have also made significant contributions to this 
academic area, for example Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
                                                           
1
 I am indebted to Mr. Prof. Josef Windsperger, University of Vienna, for helpful comments and instructions and I am 
also grateful to Mr. Kai Philip, Oxford Brookes University, and Mr. Chris North, University of Vienna and University of 
Exeter, for doing proof reading, though of course the responsibility for the paper is solely mine.  
Ich habe mich bemüht, sämtliche Inhaber der Bildrechte ausfindig zu machen und ihre Zustimmung zur Verwendung 
der Bilder in dieser Arbeit eingeholt. Sollte dennoch eine Urheberrechtsverletzung bekannt werden, ersuche ich um 
Meldung bei mir. 
2
 Berle & Means, 1968 (1932), P310.  
3
 Smith, 1776,  P700. 
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Fama and Jensen (1983a,b), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hart (1995), 
Schleifer and Vishny (1997), Zingales (1998), Tirole (2006) etc. 
Adam Smith’s “division of labor” is actually the “division of knowledge assets”, 
as Hayak and Austrian School pointed out. Buchanan (1975) 4argued that 
economics is more a “science of contract” than a “science of choice”. In this 
sense, the maximiser should be replaced by the arbitrator, so that any 
conflicting claims can be resolved through compromise5; the Edgeworth-
Bowly Box should replace Marshall’s Supply-Demand Model; Game theory 
should be the “basic mathematics”6; “solutions of n-person games” should 
replace the nth order conditions for maxima and minima7; “gains-from-trade” 
should replace “maximization”8. These are generally the economic basis of 
this paper.  
The theme of this paper is to discuss the control rights and value-based 
corporate governance. The main research problems are as follows: Firstly, 
whose interests should be taken into consideration when setting up a 
corporate governance system: shareholder value or stakeholder value? 
Secondly, why does a firm need a corporate governance system? Why value 
based corprate governance system? Why Economic Value Added would be 
chosen as the leading instrument for the alue based corporate governance? 
Thirdly, does the value based management work in the real commmercial 
world? The aim of the paper is to explore the approaches and strategies 
which effectively control and measure value added activities at from project 
level, department level to company level. Economic Value Added is taken as 
the main instrument to conduct and assess a value based corporate 
governance. A case study of different corporate governance systems and 
Economic Value Added performances of the Original Equipment 
Manufacturers (OEMs) in Automobile industry will be conducted. 
This paper proceeds as follows: 
Chapter 2 explains the theoretical basis of corporate governance. The division 
of knowledge assets leads to the separation of ownership and control, which 
induces agency problems. Firm is a nexus of complete or incomplete 
contracts used to arrange the distribution of the residual control rights, the 
residual claims and accordingly the residual risk among all the factor holders 
that are involved in the production process. The shareholder vaue approach, 
the stakeholder approach and shared value approach would be disccussed 
and this paper mainly based on the shareholder value approach.   
                                                           
4
 Buchanan (1975, May), P225-230. 
5
 Buchanan (1975, May), P225-230. 
6
 Buchanan (1975, May), P225-230. 
7
 Buchanan (1975, May), P225-230. 
8
 Buchanan (1975, May), P225-230. 
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Chapter 3 deals with the issue of control rights and corporate governance. As 
the basis of control rights, ownership structure and ownership concentration 
will be discussed. Based on the Fixed-Investment Model and the Aghion-
Bolton Model, the necessary to introduce a corporate governance system 
would also be discussed. The formal control and real control Entrepreneurial 
would then be discussed. 
Chapter 4 explores the main topic of the paper, the value-based corporate 
governance and the main instrunment of Economic Value Added. Generally, 
corporate governance is a mechanism for ad-hoc decision making to allocate 
residual control rights and residual claims. The corporate governance systems 
around the world, typically the Anglo-American Unitary Board Model, the 
Continental European Two-tier Model and the Japanese Business Network 
Model will be introduced and compared. The main instrument Economic Value 
Added (EVA) will then be introduced and explored in detail.  
Chapter 5 is the case study of value-based management in the global 
automobile industry. Daimler AG, Volkswagen AG and BMW Group from 
Germany, General Motors (GM) and Ford Motors from the United States, 
Toyota Motors and Honda Motors from Japan would be chosen as examples 
for the case study, whereby their shareholder structures, corporate 
governance systems and Economic Value Added results from 2001 to 2010 
would be presented and analysed. 
Chapter 6 is conclusion and discussion. 
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Chapter 2 Knowledge assets, Agency Problem and 
Shareholder Value 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Knowledge Assets and Agency Problem 
 
This section gives a brief background of agency problem. As Windsperger and 
Yurdakul (2007) summarized, due to information asymmetry, tangible 
(contractible) and intangible (non-contractible) knowledge assets are identified 
and split up. Tangible knowledge assets “can be codified, and are easily 
transferred by contract”9, hence “non-residual decision rights (as decision 
actions) are explicitly stipulated in contracts”10. On the contrary, intangible 
knowledge assets “cannot be codified due to their tacit 
characteristics…(and)...residual decision rights must be allocated because 
they cannot be easily communicated and specified in contracts due to too high 
transaction costs”11. 
Generally speaking, the agency problem arises because of the separation of 
ownership and control, which is resulted from the division of intangible (non-
contractible) knowledge assets. The principal and the agent try to make 
contracts to share the residual risk and residual income, which induces high 
transaction costs such as “the costs of structuring, monitoring, and bonding a 
set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests”12.  
Moral hazard, adverse selection, hidden characteristics, hidden information, 
as well as the hidden action and hold-up problem, are among the typical 
agency problems, of which moral hazard is the most popular one in corporate 
governance. Tirole (2006)13 has summarized it as follows:  
(1) Insufficient efforts. It could happen when managers spend working 
hours in doing unimportant tasks and when they react “unpleasantly or 
inconveniently to cut costs by switching to a less costly supplier, by 
                                                           
9
 Windsperger & Yurdakul, 2007, P73-74 
10
 Windsperger & Yurdakul, 2007, P73-74 
11
 Windsperger & Yurdakul, 2007, P73-74 
12
 Schleifer & W.Vishny, 1997, P740-742 
13
 Tirole, 2006, P16 
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reallocating the 
negotiations”14. 
(2) Extravagant investment. 
projects or build clans. 
(3) Entrenchment strategies
either excessive or insufficient risk 
(4) Self-dealing such as
some cases managers may “
or at least like-minded individuals who will not criticize or cast a shadow 
on their past management
kinship grounds”16
Figure 2.1 the Management Decision Process
Source: illustrated by the author with the ideas from
As a response to the agency problem, 
process could be divided 
(2) Ratification; (3) Implementation; (4) Monitoring
normally done by the same agents
                                                          
14
 Tirole, 2006, P16 
15
 Tirole, 2006, P17 
16
 Tirole, 2006, P17 
17
 Tirole, 2006, P17 
18
 Fama and Jensen (1983), P301-25
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It could happen when managers 
 
. It could happen when managers 
taking. 
 thievery, information leakage or corruption. 
pick their successor amongst
”
15
, “select a costly supplier on friendship or 
, or “finance political parties of their liking
 
 (Fama & C.Jensen, 1983, P303
generally the management decision 
into four steps, as figure 2.1 illustrated
18
. The first two s
 and hence can be generally t
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resource utilization
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performance of
agents and implementation
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“Decision Management Process”; while the rest two steps to form the so-
called “Decision Control Process”, as figure 2.1 illustrates. 
 
 
 
2.2 Firm Theory  
 
Before discussing control system and governance structure of a firm, it makes 
sense to first shed light on the firm itself. In neoclassical economics, firm is 
treated as “black boxes” which works perfectly to turn input into output. 
However, why there are still firms when the free market is efficient enough to 
balance the needs and supply? Where are the boundaries between firms and 
the market? How are decisions made and delegated inside the firms?  
Transaction Cost Approach 
Coase (1937) pointed out that free market is not free, because price 
mechanism induces transaction costs of, such as the cost to discover the 
relevant prices, the cost to negotiate, and the cost to write and enforce 
contracts etc. All factor holders that are involved in the production process 
such as workers, capital providers, managers etc., can write individual 
contracts with the central agent to obey his orders within certain limits19. In 
this sense, contract is used to definite the limits of the power boundaries 
among different factor holders. “A firm, therefore, consists of the system of 
relationships which come into existence when the direction of resource use is 
dependent on”20 the central agent. The boundary of the firm lies at the point 
where “the costs of organizing an extra transaction within the firm become 
equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an 
exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm”21. 
Incomplete Contract Approach 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Schwartz (1998) pointed out that writing a 
complete contract is impossible not only because of transactions costs,  but 
also because of following factors22: Firstly, in a complex and highly 
unpredictable world, all future contingencies cannot be fully foreseen; 
Secondly, due to bounded rationality, it is hard for the contracting parties to 
process very complex information, especially in case of intangible (non-
                                                           
19
 Coase, 1937, P390-395 
20
 Coase, 1937, P390-395 
21
 Coase, 1937, P390-395 
22
 Fama & C.Jensen, 1983, P302 
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contractible) knowledge assets, the contract would contain gap and missing 
provisions.  
Fama and Jensen (1983) hence viewed the firm as the “nexus of contracts, 
written and unwritten, among owners of factors of production and 
customers”23, which on one hand, “specify the rights of each agent in the 
organization, performance criteria on which agents are evaluated, and the 
payoff functions they face”24, on the other hand, specify “(a) the nature of 
residual claims and (b) the allocation of the steps of the decision process 
among agents”25. “The contract structure combines with available production 
technologies and external legal constraints to determine the cost function for 
delivering an output with a particular form of organization”26. Moreover, 
contracts are the basis arrangements for the distribution of rights to residual 
claims and residual risk. This is akin to Zingales (1998)’s definition of the firm 
as a nexus of contracts for “a combination of mutually specialized assets and 
people”27and as “a network of specific investments that cannot be replicated 
by the market”28. 
Property Rights Approach 
Property rights are “the right to use the asset, the right to obtain the income 
from the asset, and the right to sell the asset”29. The property rights are the 
sources of possession of residual control rights especially when contracts are 
incomplete: “the right to decide all usages of the asset in any way not 
inconsistent with a prior contract, custom, or law”30. According to the property 
rights approach, the holders of certain knowledge assets should have the right 
to make or transfer the right to make the residual decision rights and get the 
residual income.   
 
 
 
2.3 Shareholder Value vs. Stakeholder Value vs. Shared Value 
 
Shareholder value theory argues that the aim of management should be 
maximizing the shareholder’s value, while the stakeholder value theory argues 
that the manager should commit their duties toward all stakeholders such as 
                                                           
23
 Fama & C.Jensen, 1983, P302 
24
 Fama & C.Jensen, 1983, P302 
25
 Fama & C.Jensen, 1983, P302 
26
 Fama & C.Jensen, 1983, P302 
27
 Zingales, 1998, P498 
28
 Zingales, 1998, P498 
29
 Hart, 1998, P330-331 
30
 Hart, 1998, P29-30 
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employees, communities, creditors, and suppliers. However, in many 
situations, there are conflicts among different interests groups. In mature 
market economies, professional managers would always try to find the 
balance among various interests groups before they make decisions. How to 
find the balance of different groups’ interests? Which group’s interests should 
be taken into consideration firstly, and to what extent? 
Tirole (2006), Williamson (1985) and Zingales (1998) prefer the shareholder 
Value approach. The main reasons are that the sharing of the control rights 
among various stakeholders: 
- may discourage financing in the first place, and generate less 
pledgable income31. 
- may “create inefficiencies in decision making”32, because in many 
circumstances “investors and natural stakeholder have conflicting 
objectives”33 , which would induce deadlocks. 
- may reduce managerial accountabilities. Instead of a well-defined and 
verifiable mission, the managers may face multiple and hard-to-
measure missions, which may lead to moral hazard problems34. 
 
Williamson (1985) also supported shareholder value approach: 
“The suppliers of finance bear a unique relation to the firm: the whole of 
their investment in the firm is potentially placed at hazard. By contrast: 
the productive assets (plant and equipment; human capital) of suppliers 
of raw material, labor, intermediate products, electric power, and the 
like normally remains in the suppliers’ possession”35. 
Moreover, Yong & O'Byrne (2001) suggested that managers should pay 
attention that:  
“Capital has attained a degree of mobility that is unprecedented in 
human history, and it will go where it is most appreciated...companies 
must not be competitive in commercial market, but they must also be 
competitive in capital market. Otherwise their cost of capital will be 
higher than their competitors’”36.  
However, Porter and Kramer (2011) criticized the traditional shareholder value 
approach in their recent article in Harvard Business Review. They argue that: 
“facing growing competition and shorter-term performance pressures 
from shareholders, managers resorted to waves of restructuring, 
personnel reductions, and relocation to lower-cost regions, while 
                                                           
31
 Tirole, 2006, P59 
32
 Tirole, 2006, P59 
33
 Tirole, 2006, P59 
34
 Tirole, 2006, P59 
35
 Zingales, 1998, P500-501 
36
 Yong & O'Byrne, 2001, P8 
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leveraging balance sheets to return capital to investors. The results 
were often commoditization, price competition, little true innovation, 
slow organic growth, and no clear competitive advantage”37.  
As a response, they introduce a new approach “shared value”. The aim of 
shared value is to expand the total pool of economic and social value, which 
involves creating economic value in a way that also creates value for society 
by addressing its needs and challenges38. Shared value can be achieved “by 
reconceiving products and markets, redefining productivity in the value chain, 
and building supportive industry clusters at the company’s locations”39. They 
argue that “shared value opens up many new needs to meet, new products to 
offer, new customers to serve, and new ways to configure the value chain”40, 
which would create more sustainable competitive advantages.  
Figure 2.2 Shareholder Return Indexes, 1801-2003 
 
Source: Koller, Goedhart, Wessels,  McKinsey, 2005, P136 
However, in the long run, the stock markets are not that chaotic and 
shortsighted as Porter and Kramer (2011) imagined. The capital markets can 
identify and reward the companies which have long-term value creation 
strategies, as figure 2.2 shows. Koller, Goedhart and Wessels (2005) found 
that there is “a strong positive relation between shareholder returns and 
investment in R&D”41and that “stock markets are perfectly capable of seeing 
the economic fundamentals behind accounting information”42and can even 
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mirror “economic fundamentals throughout a century of technical revolutions, 
monitory changes, political and economic crises, and wars”43.  
As a general framework for value creation, the ability to create value can be 
measured in two dimensions: “the level of peak return on invested capital 
(ROIC) and the sustainability of the returns in excess of the cost of capital”44, 
as illustrated in figure 2.3. The market value of the companies is “determined 
by the company’s absolute level of long-term performance and growth, i.e. the 
expected revenue, earnings growth and return on invested capital (ROIC)”45.  
Figure 2.3 A General Model of Value Creation 
 
Source: Koller, Goedhart, Wessels,  McKinsey, 2005, P136 
In conclusion, the firm exists because of the high transaction cost of the 
market itself and it is a set of contracts to specify the distribution of residual 
risk, residual claims and the decision making process. Agency problems arise 
because of the separation of ownership and control, which has roots in the 
division of knowledge assets. Based on the property rights point of view, the 
author agrees that although shareholder value and other stakeholder value or 
shared value should all be taken into consideration, shareholder value would 
be given the most weight and is considered to be the most important factor, 
because (1) capital providers bear more risk than other stakeholders, (2) the 
capital markets would award those companies who create more shareholder 
value; (3) the management process needs a clarified set of goals to make 
decision.     
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Chapter 3 Control Rights and Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Ownership Structure and Ownership Concentration 
 
Demsetz (1998) pointed out that “in a world in which institutional 
arrangements reflect rational calculation, ownership is based on both scarcity 
and on the ability to influence the impact of scarcity through the exercise of 
control over the scare resources”46. This is akin to the arguments of 
Windsperger and Yurdakul (2007): 
“the more intangible knowledge assets one person has relative to 
another person, the more important are his assets for the generation of 
residual income, and the more residual decision rights should be 
assigned to that person… (and hence)…the more residual income 
rights should be transferred to him”47.  
The ownership structure and ownership concentration are generally taken as 
the basis for the distribution of control rights. According to figure 3.1, the 
ownership structures of leading corporations in different countries are quite 
different, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries, the ownership structures are 
more dispersed and the ownership concentration rates are lower. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) found that “ownership is extremely dispersed in the U.S, above 
50% of Fortune 500 firms have at least one shareholder holding a block 
exceeding 5%, large blocks are relatively rare…the median largest 
shareholder has only 9% of the firm’s equity”48. 
Banks and other financial institutions, insurance companies, pension funds, 
mutual funds, families, governments, nonfinancial business and households 
are the main players in the capital market. For example, in Germany the 
financial institutions occupy greater market shares. In non-Anglo-Saxon 
countries pension funds and mutual funds seem to play a less dominant role. 
As illustrated in table 3.1 and table 3.2, ownership share of nonfinancial 
business especially cross-shareholdings among firms is widespread.  
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Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hong Kong
Ireland
Isreal
Italy
Japan
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Portugal
Singapore
South Korea
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
Figure 3.1 Who Controls the World's Great Corporations?
No Controlling 
Shareholder
Wealthy 
Families
Governments Widely Held 
Financial Institutions
Widely Held 
Non-financial Firms
Other
Source: La Porta et. (1999) with Japanese data augumented by morck and Nakamura (1999) to account for 
combined keiretsu stakes and German data augumented with information from Baums (1995) to account for bank 
proxy voting. 
Notes: Fraction of top ten firms with different types of controlling shareholders is shown for each country. Control is 
assumed if any shareholder or group of shareholders believed to work in consort controls 20 percent of the votes in a 
country’s annual shareholder meeting.49 
Family plays an important role as controlling owner not only in developed 
countries like Sweden, Switzerland, Israel, Germany and Hong Kong, but also 
in developing countries such as Mexico and Argentina, as illustrated in table 
3.3 and figure 3.1. Faccio and Lang (2002) find that “54% of European firms 
have only one controlling owner and that more than two-thirds of the family-
controlled firms have top managers from the controlling family”50. Claessens 
et al. (2002) found that “more than two-thirds of the firms are controlled by a 
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single shareholder, and about 60% of the firms that are not widely held are 
managed by someone related to the family of the controlling shareholder”51.  
Country
No. 
of 
firms
Mean 
largest 
holder
Stand. 
Dev. 
Largest 
holder
Median 
largest 
holder
Family 
holdings
Financial 
holdings
Non-
financial 
holdings
State 
holdings Dispersed
Argentina 8 40,2 14,9 41,3 12,5 25,0 50,0 12,5 0,0
Australia 114 24,8 19,3 17,1 30,7 17,5 30,7 0,0 21,1
Austria 30 59,4 21,7 54,5 6,7 23,3 53,3 16,7 0,0
Brazil 25 58,6 22,6 59,4 12,0 12,0 56,0 20,0 0,0
Canada 280 37,0 24,7 29,7 34,6 19,6 40,4 3,3 2,1
Finland 34 26,9 19,8 20,7 5,9 17,6 38,2 23,6 14,7
France 187 48,9 24,3 50,0 25,1 17,6 51,3 2,3 3,7
Germany 240 54,0 24,7 51,7 26,7 15,4 48,8 7,0 2,1
Great Britain 687 16,0 13,3 11,8 17,9 37,0 15,1 1,8 28,2
Hong Kong 43 38,6 15,5 35,6 14,0 34,9 51,2 0,0 0,0
India 37 45,1 13,8 39,9 2,7 2,7 43,2 51,4 0,0
Italy 57 45,2 18,6 47,5 3,5 40,4 47,4 3,4 5,3
Japan 1036 15,1 13,3 8,9 5,9 6,6 58,1 0,2 29,2
Mexico 8 47,4 11,8 50,8 50,0 0,0 50,0 0,0 0,0
Netherlands 66 27,1 25,0 16,0 6,1 13,6 43,9 6,1 30,3
Norway 42 29,9 17,0 26,9 16,7 23,8 47,6 7,1 4,8
Singapore 97 38,5 19,5 34,0 27,8 28,9 43,3 0,0 0,0
South Africa 25 42,2 17,1 44,8 24,0 24,0 48,0 4,0 0,0
South Korea 16 19,1 17,6 12,8 25,0 6,3 25,0 12,4 31,3
Spain 59 37,8 25,9 29,1 1,7 23,7 57,6 8,5 8,5
Sweden 54 28,3 16,2 25,0 16,7 38,9 33,3 3,7 7,4
Switzerland 66 45,6 27,7 48,0 33,3 10,6 42,4 4,6 9,1
Taiwan 11 15,8 19,5 5,4 18,2 9,1 9,1 9,1 54,5
Turkey 5 41,5 19,3 37,1 20,0 40,0 40,0 0,0 0,0
United States 3070 21,9 15,5 16,8 47,3 25,9 14,6 0,9 11,3
United States 
(largest) 500 13,5 12,9 10,3 3,4 9,2 6,6 0,5 80,3
Table 3.1 Ownership Concentration and Identities in Selected Countries
Source: Mueller, 2003, P96 
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U.S. Japan France Germany U.K. Japan France Germany
1. Banks and other 
    financial institutions 2,3 9,0 12,1 10,5 12,6 7,4 12,6 33,5
2. Insurance companies 7,3 4,3 19,9 7,3
3. Pension funds 16,9 5,4 15,6 5,6
4. Mutual funds 19,5 1,9 5,9 11,3 4,5 6,6 19,0 4,6
5. Households 42,5 14,0 19,5 14,7 14,3 16,8 6,5 22,9
6. Nonfinancial business n.a 43,7 34,3 34,2 0,8 38,1 20,2 11,7
7. Government 0,7 14,0 4,5 2,7 0,1 4,1 3,6 1,9
8. Foreign 10,6 7,7 19,2 16,6 32,1 14,0 31,2 18,1
Source: Tirole (2006) P37
Table 3.2 Ownership of common stock (as a percentage of total outstanding 
common shares in 2002) for (a) all equity and (b) listed equity
(a) (b)
4,5 9,9 7,0 7,4
 
France Germany U.K. Hong Kong Japan Taiwan
Widely held 14 10 63 7 80 26
Family 65 64 24 67 10 48
Identified family 26 27 12
Unlisted firms 39 38 11
State 5 6 0 1 1 3
Widely held corporation 4 4 0 20 3 6
Widely held financial 11 9 9 5 7 5
Miscellaneous 1 3 3
Cross-holdings 0 2 0
Number of firms 607 704 1953 330 1240 141
Europe Asia
Table 3.3 Identity of controlling owners in selected countries 
in Europe (1996-2000) and Asia (1996) (%)
Source: Tirole (2006) P40-41, Faccio and Long (2002). Reprinted from Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 65, 
M.Faccio and L.Lang, The ultimate ow nership of Wetern European corporations, pp365-395, Copyright (2002); 
Claessens et al.(2002), Reprinted from Journal of Financial Economics, Volume 58, S.Claessens, S.Djankov, and 
L.Lang. The separation of ow nership and control in East Aisan corporations, pp.81-112, Copyright (2000)  
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3.2 Control Rights 
 
Control rights are the “rights for a party (or group of parties) to affect the 
course of action in certain circumstances once the firm has gotten started”52. 
Control rights have following characteristics: 
(1) Contingency. For instance, the ownership rights would transfer to the 
entrepreneur when a patent is awarded or the key financial indicators 
surpass some threshold value53.   
(2) Transferability. For instance, one “can use one’s control right over 
decision A as a bargaining chip to obtain concession along dimension 
B”54. 
Generally speaking, there are five types of control rights: 
(1) Complete control. It is popular with private corporation especially family 
enterprises, in which “a single individual or small group of associates 
own all or practically all the outstanding stock” 55.  
(2) Major control. “In a truly large corporation…more often control is 
maintained with a relatively small proportion of ownership”56. 
(3) Control through a legal device without major ownership. Family 
holdings, financial holdings, non-financial holdings, state holdings and 
cross holdings are the major forms57. 
(4) Minority control. “When an individual or small group hold a sufficient 
stock interest to be in a position to dominate a corporation through their 
stock interest”58, they have actually the working control of the company. 
An example would be so-called block holders.  
(5) Management control. This occurs “when contracts are incomplete and 
managers possess more expertise than shareholders, managers 
typically end up with the residual rights of control” 59.  
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3.3 The Fixed-Investment Model 
 
In order to form a basis to analyze markets in terms of control rights and 
corporate governance, the Fixed-Investment Model is introduced as a starting 
scenario.  
As illustrated in figure 3.2, assume that an entrepreneur has assets A and 
wants pursue a project, which requires a fixed investment I (A < I). He then 
borrows I-A from investors and there could be 2 possible outcome 
Scenario 1: the project succeed with probability of p and verifiable income R 
(R > 0), from which  for entrepreneur and  for investors;  
Scenario 2: the project fails with probability of 1-p, and hence generates no 
income.  
Figure 3.2 the Fixed-Investment Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tirole, 2006, P115 
For the purpose of simplicity, assume that both entrepreneur and investors 
have limited liabilities and no time preference, and they are risk neutral. The 
rate of return expected by the investors is 0, which means investors break 
even and do not earn supernormal profits in a competitive capital market. 
Hence, the Net Present Value (NPV) of the project would be wholly granted to 
the entrepreneur. The project is subject to moral hazard and hence there 
would be two possible scenarios61: 
Scenario 1: the entrepreneur can behave, which would yield success with 
probability p＝  and verifiable profit R, but no private benefit.   
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Financing stage  
Project costs I; 
Entrepreneur 
has equity A < I; 
Borrows I-A; 
Moral-hazard stage  Outcome stage  
Entrepreneur’s choice 
affects the probability of 
success:  
p＝ (no private benefit)   
p＝  (private benefit B) 
Verifiable profit:  
R with probability p,  
0 with probability 1-p 
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Scenario 2: the entrepreneur may misbehave, which would yield success with 
probability p＝ (p < p	) and verifiable profit 0, but private benefit B (B > 0). 
Let ∆p   – . 
In order to persuade the entrepreneur to behave, two constraints should be 
met: 
(1) Incentive compatibility constraint62:  the entrepreneur receives 
greater income when he behaves than private benefit he would get 
when he misbehaves.   
 ∆p ≥ B        () 
(2) Investor breakeven constraint63: If the entrepreneur behaves, the 
project should at least yield more value to the investor than the original 
cost of the investment   
(R - ∆) ≥ I-A                           (  ) 
If both the “Incentive compatibility constraint” () and “Investor 
breakeven constraint” (  ) are met, the “Expected Pledgable Income” 
would be  
          (R - ∆)                                                Expected Pledgable Income
64
 
and the “Residual Claim of Entrepreneur” would be:  
         NPV＝ R – I                                   Residual Claim of Entrepreneur65 
This is the basic model to illustrate how entrepreneur and investors finance 
projects through contracting. A complete contract is signed to arrange all the 
future contingencies and the distribution of residual risk and residual claim. In 
this case no corporate governance systems are needed. In the following 
sections, corporate governance systems would be introduced based on this 
basic model. 
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3.4 Market for Control Rights: the Aghion-Bolton Model 
 
Based on the “Fixed-Investment Model”, Tirole (2006) argues that by 
allocating control rights, in order to attract sufficient financing investors would 
enable the entrepreneur to commit efficiently to generate more residual claims 
to investors66. The entrepreneur would choose to take interim actions, which 
are profit enhancing activities such as by “switching to a more routine but 
more profitable strategy, (by) serving a long-time relationship with a 
collaborator, firing workers, or (by) divesting a division that management is 
eager to run “67. As figure 3.3 illustrates, this would in turn raise the possibility 
of project success uniformly by τ (τ › 0), from (, ) to ( + τ, + τ)68. 
However, interim actions would generate private cost γ (γ › 0) for the 
entrepreneur. In first-best situation, when the entrepreneur chooses to take 
interim actions and create more value than the cost (τR > γ), the Net Present 
Value (NPV) increases from R – I to ( + τ)R - I - γ and the pledgable 
income would also increase from (R-B/∆p) to (+ τ )(R-B/∆p)69. In short, 
the transfer of control rights to investors facilitates financing and increases the 
pledgeable income and thus increases the utility of the entrepreneur70.  
Figure 3.3 the Aghion-Bolton Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Tirole, 2006, P390 
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In practice, the entrepreneur may have to relinquish control rights in order to 
be able to finance growth, for instance through IPO. Conversely, 
“entrepreneur prefer to sacrifice growth and keep control over operating, 
investment, and personal decisions, e.g. not being able to select one’s heir is 
akin to the cost γ in the model”71. In conclusion, the entrepreneur’s preference 
over control rights may have great influence on the corporate governance 
structure.   
 
 
 
3.5 Formal Control vs. Real Control  
 
Control rights are the basis of corporate governance structure. Tirole (2006) 
summarized control rights in two categories72: 
Formal control 
Typical situations are that the control right are mostly “enjoyed by a family with 
a majority of voting shares, by headquarters over divisions in a conglomerate, 
or by a venture capitalist with explicit control rights over a start-up 
The advantage of the formal control is that It “enables large owners to, directly 
and unencumbered…implement the changes he deems necessary”74. 
Real control 
It could happen in two situations75:  
Scenario 1: minority control 
Minority shareholders, such as block holders, could “persuade other owners 
or at least a fraction of them sufficient to create a dissenting majority of the 
need for intervention”76. In this case, since there is a “free rider problem”, its 
success depends on two factors: (1) “ease of communication and of coalition-
building with other investors; (2) congruence of interest among others 
owners”77. The degree of congruence itself depends on many factors such as 
the minority owner’s reputation, his stake in the firm and the absence of 
conflict of interests.   
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Scenario 2: Management control   
Managers can often obtain real control, because they are normally better 
informed than investors and thus they can influence decision making. Whether 
managers can exercise real control depends on following conditions: (1) the 
trustworthy the managers appear to uninformed parties, which in turn depends 
on their incentives; (2) the alignment of interests between managers and 
investors78.  
Based on Aghion-Bolten Model79, assume that:  
(1) The initial contract allocates formal control rights to investors and specifies 
a compensation schema  for the entrepreneur in the case of project 
success. The investors bear cost γ to increase probability of success by τ ; 
(2) When the entrepreneur shirks and profit-decreasing actions happen, the 
entrepreneur gets extra private benefit beyond B;  
The investors would trust and agree with the entrepreneur when their 
expected value of benefits is positive (E (τ I τ ≥0) ≥0), which implies that 
“the key to managerial real control is congruence… (and) the higher the power 
of the managerial incentive scheme, the more likely it is that investors will go 
along with the entrepreneur’s proposal”80. 
The strength of the balance sheet, which is measured by the entrepreneur’s 
initial assets A, can affect the distribution of the formal and real control rights. 
Generally, “a firm with strong balance sheet (a higher A) must pay back less 
to investors; thus  is large and so the entrepreneur enjoys much real control 
over decisions”81.  
In conclusion, the ownership structure and ownership concentration are the 
basis for the distribution of control rights, which helps shape the corporate 
governance structure. Fixed-Investment Model illustrates the benchmark 
situation how entrepreneur and investors finance projects and arrange 
distribution of residual risk and residual claim through complete contracting. 
However, according to the Aghion-Bolton Model, in case of agency problem, 
corporate governance instruments can help generate better corporate 
outcome, this is the theoretical basis for the necessity to introduce corporate 
governance.  
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Chapter 4 Value-based Corporate Governance and Economic 
Value Added 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Corporate Governance  
 
According to Aghion-Bolton Model, since the initial contract is incomplete, it 
can’t fully specify the distribution of residual risk and residual claims in every 
possible contingency. Zingales(1998) defined corporate governance as “the 
complex set of constraints that shape the ex post bargaining over the quasi 
rents generated by a firm”82. In the same sense, Hart(1995) defined corporate 
governance as “a mechanism for making decisions that have not been 
specified in the initial contract…(for) allocating residual rights of control over 
the firm`s nonhuman assets and the right to decide how these assets should 
be used” 83. 
Generally speaking, a good corporate governance system is “the set of criteria 
and tools necessary to ensure, in accordance with the rules, sustainable value 
creation, strategic effectiveness and operational efficiency in an 
organization”84. In this sense, the objectives of a corporate governance 
system are as follows:  
- “to maximize the incentives for value enhancing investments, while 
minimizing inefficient power seeking; 
- to minimize the ex post bargaining;  
- to minimize any “governance” risk and allocate the residual risk to 
the least risk-averse parties”85. 
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4.2 Corporate Governance Systems around the World 
 
Thanks to economic globalization, especially in forms of multinational 
companies, worldwide merger and acquisitions, and the global financing, a 
global convergence of corporate governance is under discussion. Generally, 
there are three types of corporate governances around the world: 
Anglo-American Unitary Board Model86 
It is popular in the US, the UK and also the so-called commonwealth countries 
such as Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, South Africa and Singapore. 
It is a market-oriented, outsider corporate governance system, which relies 
mostly on exit-based, external mechanisms. It is based on case law tradition, 
thus a perspective rule based legal approach to governance. It is a self-
regulated system and thus compliance is voluntary. It takes the “comply or 
explain” except for in the US due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which transforms 
decision making into mostly a rule-based approach.  
Continental European Two-tier Model87 
It is the most popular model in continental European countries such as 
Germany, Austria, France and Italy. Banks are always the most important 
shareholders and the corporate governance system rests predominantly on 
internal mechanisms. It is based on the rule-based European law tradition. 
“The co-determination rules in Germany require one half of the supervisory 
board to represent labor, with employee representative directors elected 
through the trades unions, the other half to represent capital, elected by the 
shareholders”. Mostly there are strong works councils which represent the 
employees wield power. 
Japanese Business Network Model88 
It is also called Keiretsu, which are “networks of companies in Japan 
connected through cross-holding and with interlocking directorships”89. It is a 
reflection of the social networking within Japanese society, which emphasis 
on unity “throughout the organization, non-adversarial relationships, lifetime 
employment, enterprise unions, personal policies encouraging commitment, 
initiation into the corporate family, decision making by consensus, cross-
functional training, and with promotion based on loyalty and social 
compatibility as well as performance”90. 
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In Europe corporate governance systems are quite diversified, there are 
unitary board, two-tier board and mixed system, as figure 4.1 illustrates. 
Heidrick & Struggles (2009) compared the quality of the corporate governance 
systems in some European countries by analyzing three different 
dimensions91: (1) transparency (directors, remuneration and committees); (2) 
composition of the board (board independence, diversity, composition of 
committees); (3) working style of the board (availability, committee structure, 
and board evaluation and inertia factor). The results are showed in the figure 
4.2.  
Figure 4.1 European Corporate Governance Systems 
 
Source: Heidrick & Struggles, 2009, P9 
Figure 4.2 European Corporate Governance Ranking 2009 
 
Source: Heidrick & Struggles, 2009, P9 
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Different governance systems have different ownership structure, corporate 
strategies, laws, governance codes, cultures, economic systems and histories 
of evolution. As figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 illustrate, although the Anglo-
American Model outperforms the other two, we cannot simply conclude that it 
is the best solution for every country. Anglo-American Model is still far from 
perfect, as the recent Financial Crisis of 2007–2010 demonstrated.   
     Figure 4.3 US Companies Valued Higher than Europe and Asia 
 
Source: Koller, Goedhart, Wessels, & McKinsey, 2005, P14 
 
Figure 4.4 US Companies Earn Higher Returns on Equity 
 
Source: Koller, Goedhart, Wessels, & McKinsey, 2005, P14 
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However, there are some factors which always have the same identities 
among the good corporate governance systems around the world: (1) at 
national level, countries with good corporate governance practice always have 
stronger national competition (see appendix 1 and appendix 2); (2) at the 
industry and company levels, companies with good corporate governance can 
create more value and thus are outperformance other competitors (see 
appendix 3, appendix 4 and appendix 5).    
 
 
 
4.3 Economic Value Added (EVA)92 
 
The aim of good corporate governance systems should be the creation of 
value, either for shareholders or for stakeholders. As figure 4.5 illustrates, a 
good corporate governance system should have consistent standards, goals, 
indicators and terminology during the whole value creating process, which 
typically includes the following steps: goal setting, planning, capital allocation, 
performance measurements and incentive compensation. The typical 
indicators of value creation are Economic Profit, Economic Value Added 
(EVA), Return on Investment (ROI) and Market Value Added (MVA) etc.  
In this paper the author choose Economic Value Added (EVA) as the key 
indicator for a good corporate governance system. The reasons are: (1) 
Economic Value Added (EVA) can be used for both forward-looking 
and performance measurement; (2) Technically speaking, it can be aligned to 
management compensation, as figure 4.6 shows; (3) Economic Value Added 
(EVA) is similar to the accounting profit indicator “Residual Income”, but it 
actually converts the “Residual Income” into a flow measurement of economic 
profit, the so-called “Rents”93, as figure 4.7 illustrates. In the sense of 
opportunity cost, revenues should be sufficient to cover all operating costs 
and all capital cost (including the cost of equity finance). 
Economic Value Added (EVA) can be calculated in two ways, as illustrated in 
figure 4.7, whereby the invested capital equals the sum of the entire firm’s 
“financing, apart from short-term, non-interest-bearing liabilities, such as 
accounts payable, accrued wages, and accrued taxes”94.  
 
                                                           
92
 EVA® is a registered trademark of Stern Stewart & Co. 
93
 Yong & O'Byrne, 2001, P43 
94
 Yong & O'Byrne, 2001, P43 
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Figure 4.5 A Good Governance
Figure 4.6 EVA: Bridging the Gap between Valuation and 
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Figure 4.7 Definition and Calculation of Economic Value Added
 
Source: Illustrated by the author according to 
O'Byrne, 2001, P35-54.  
Based on the economic value added schema, 
value could be as follows
1. Increase returns on existing capital 
equity, and improving asset efficiency.
2. Generate profitable growth. To 
capital by investing
3. Divest from value
4. Reduce the cost of capital
minimizes the firm’s cost of capita
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4.4 Capital Allocation Process 
 
At the project level, during the capital allocation process, the decisions over 
capital allocation should be aligned with the firm’s strategic goals in order to 
build profitable growth and create value, as figure 4.8 illustrates. Two 
dimensions should be taken into consideration96: Firstly, how much potential 
would the projects characteristics (potential value-creating ideas, strategies, 
product innovations, or promotional campaigns, as figure 4.8 shows) create 
value for the firm? Secondly, does the firm have enough resources to realize 
those projects, which would either increase the efficiency or boom growth?  
Figure 4.8 Strategic Capital Allocation: Building Profitable Growth, 
Releasing Unemployed Assets 
 
Source: Nenning, 2006, P7 
Economic value added schema can be also aligned with the project capital 
allocation and investment implement process can be the indicator and this is 
the basis for the value-creating activities at the firm level, as figure 4.9 
illustrates.  
In conclusion, since the initial contract is incomplete, corporate governance 
systems are introduced to specify the distribution of residual risk and residual 
claims. There are three popular types of corporate governance systems 
around the world: Anglo-American Unitary Board Model, Continental 
European Two-tier Model and Japanese Business Network Model. Good 
corporate governance is vital to the competitiveness of the firm, the industry 
and the national competitiveness and social welfare. Economic Value Added 
(EVA) is chosen as the key indicator for the corporate governance system 
because it maps the whole value creating processes which cover all operating 
costs and all capital cost at various levels. 
                                                           
96
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Figure 4.9 Capital Allocation and Investment implement Process
Source: Illustrated by the author with the 
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Chapter 5 Case Study: Value-based Management in Global 
Automobile Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Overview of Global Automobile Industry 
 
In this chapter a case study in the global automobile industry is conducted to 
check the value-creating activities in practice. The reasons why the 
automobile industry is chosen are that: (1) it is one of the strategic industries 
in industrialized countries; (2) many modern management innovations and 
management tools are well received here (e.g. Value-based management, 
lean production, Just in time etc.); (3) it is a highly competitive and globalised 
industry at both the global and local levels, which means that the automobile 
Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) face similar market conditions. As 
figure 5.1 and figure 5.2 illustrate, the automobile markets at global level are 
quite diversified and dynamic and there are various OEMs and brands in this 
industry.  
Germany, USA and Japan are chosen as examples for the three different 
types of corporate governance systems in the chapter 4. The 3 countries are 
all famous for their automobile industry and are all among the world most 
competitive economic entities (see Appendix 1 World Competitiveness 
Scoreboard 2010 and Appendix 2 Global Competitiveness Index 2010–2011 
(Top 60)).  
The following automobile OEMs are chosen as examples based on their size 
and reputation (see Appendix 3 2010 Fortune Global 500 (Top 100) and 
Appendix 4 2011 World’s Most Admired Companies):  
Germany:  Daimler AG, Volkswagen AG (VW) and BMW Group 
USA:   General Motors (GM) and Ford Motors 
Japan:  Toyota Motors and Honda Motors 
This case study will compare the shareholder structures, corporate 
governance systems and Economic Value Added of selected companies. 
However no judgment on the corresponding corporate governance systems 
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would be made, because (a) different corporate governance systems have 
different evolution histories and different economical, financial, juristical and 
cultural backgrounds; (b) the sample bases are limited to only one industry 
and seven OEMs.   
Figure 5.1 Global Automobile Industry: OEMS, Brands and Relationships 
 
Source: Matthias Wahrendorff, 2008, P12. 
Figure 5.2 Global Automotive Landscape of Markets and Players 
 (2002 –2006)
 
Source: Matthias Wahrendorff, 2008, P2. 
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5.2 Shareholder Structure
 
In this section, based on the shareholder structures, the voting rights 
control rights distributions of differe
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illustrated in Figure 5.4
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Figure 5.4 BMW Group 
Source: BMW Annual Report 2010, P4. (18.03.2011)
Figure 5.5 VW AG 
Source: Volkswagen A
53,30%
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Figure 5.6 VW AG
as of December 31, 2010
Source: Volkswagen A
The ownership structures of the two largest 
concentrated, less diversified 
However, I believe that Ford and GM
ownership structure to preserve the Ford Family control. There are two kinds 
of shares in Ford, common stocks and Class B shares. Generall
shares can only be held by Ford Family members and they revert to common 
stocks when they are sold outside Ford Family. 
own a minimum number of Class B shares, th
of the voting power”97. 
government bailout, the US Department of Treasury owns even more than 
half of the shares, as figure 5.7 illustrates. In this sense
new GM the “Government Motors
                                                          
97
 Andre F. Perold (2001), P3. As of February 2000, Ford had 1.15 billion common shares and 70.9 million Class B 
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Figure 5.7 Shareholder 
Shareholder Structure of General Motors
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Canada GEN Investment Corporation 
UAW Retiree Medical Benefits Trust
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All Directors and Executive Officers of General 
Motors Company 
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* The percentage shows the relative shareholder distribution based on the 
** "These percentages reflect the maximum potential percentage ownership of our common stock for each beneficial 
owner" (GM Annual Report 2009, P337)
Source: GM Annual Report 2009, P337. (18.03.
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The two Japanese OEMs are both listed on the
York Stock Exchange 
international shareholder bases.
companies play very important roles, as
Figure 5.8 Shareholder 
Name 
Japan Trustee Services Bank, Ltd.
Toyota Industries Corporation
The Master Trust Bank of Japan, Ltd.
Nippon Life Insurance Company
State Street Bank and Trust Company
Trust & Custody Services Bank, Ltd.
The Bank of New York Mellon
as Depositary Bank for Depositary Receipt Holders
Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd.
Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company, Limited
DENSO Corporation 
Source: Toyota Annual Report 2010
 
22,60%
Financial institutions, brokerages
Individuals, etc.
e-based Corporate Governance: Evidence from Global Automobile Industry
Junliang Bao
 Tokyo Stock Exchange
and London Stock Exchange, and hence 
 Financial institutions banks and 
 figures 5.8 and 5.9 show
Structure of Toyota Motors as of 2010
Major Shareholders (Top 10) 
(Thousands)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
, P61. (18.03.2011) 
 
 
35,40%
24,50%
17,50%
Foreign corporate entities and others
Other corporate entities
   
 
45 
, New 
both own 
insurance 
.  
 
 
Number of 
Shares Held 
 
355,468 
201,195 
191,402 
130,469 
87,827 
86,649 
79,850 
77,431 
65,166 
58,678 
Control Rights, Economic Value Added and Valu
 
Figure 5.9 Shareholder 
Name 
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Source: Honda Annual Report 2010
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5.3 Corporate Governance  
 
In this section, Daimler AG, Ford Motors and Toyota Motors are chosen as 
examples for German, American and Japanese corporate governance 
structures accordingly.  
Daimler AG 
As illustrates in figure 5.10, there are mainly three blocks of governance 
bodies at Daimler: Annual Shareholders’ Meeting, Supervisory Board and 
Board of Management.  
There is generally a separation between the corporate management and 
supervision: 
“Daimler AG is obliged by the German Stock Corporation Act to apply a 
dual management system featuring the strict separation of the two 
boards responsible for managing and supervising the company (two-
tier board). With this system, the company’s Board of Management is 
responsible for the executive functions, while the Supervisory Board 
monitors the Board of Management. No person may be a member of 
the two boards at the same time”98. 
Daimler’s Supervisory Board comprises of 20 members, half of which are 
elected by the shareholders at the Annual Meeting and the other half are 
elected by the employees in Germany. The main functions of Supervisory 
Board are “appointing and recalling the members of the Board of 
deciding on and regularly reviewing the system of Board of Management 
remuneration, and determining the individual total remuneration of the 
members of the Board of Management”99. There are four committees within 
the Supervisory Board:  
1. Presidential Committee, which “makes recommendations to the 
Supervisory Board on the appointment of members of the Board of 
Management and is responsible for their contractual affairs”100.  
2. Nomination Committee, which “makes recommendations to the 
Supervisory Board concerning persons to be proposed for election as 
members of the Supervisory Board representing the shareholders at 
the Annual Shareholders’ Meeting”101.  
                                                           
98
 Daimler’s Corporate Bodies.  
99
 Daimler Annual Report 2010, P161.  
100
 Daimler Annual Report 2010, P162.  
101
 Daimler Annual Report 2010, P162.  
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3. Audit Committee, which “deals with questions of accounting and risk 
management, the internal monitoring system, internal auditing, 
compliance and the annual external audit”102. 
4. Mediation Committee, which “makes proposals on the appointment of 
members of the Board of Management if in the first vote the majority 
required for the appointment of a Board of Management member of 
two thirds of the members of the Supervisory Board is not 
Daimler’s Board of Management compromises of 7 members and is 
generally responsible for managing the group. It “prepares the consolidated 
interim reports, the annual company financial statements of Daimler AG and 
the annual consolidated financial statements”104 and “is responsible for 
adherence to the provisions of applicable law, official regulations and the 
Group’s internal guidelines, and works to secure compliance with those rules 
and regulations by the companies of the Group”105.  
 
Shareholders can exercise their voting rights at Annual Shareholders’ 
Meeting based on “one share one vote” principal. The main functions of 
Annual Shareholders’ Meeting are to decide “on the appropriation of 
distributable profits, the ratification of the actions of the members of the Board 
of Management and the Supervisory Board, the election of the external 
auditors and the election of the members of the Supervisory Board 
representing the shareholders…(and) amendments to the Articles of 
Incorporation, capital measures, and the approval of certain intercompany 
agreements”106.  
 
Figure 5.10 Daimler’s Governance Structure 
 
Source: Daimler Annual Report 2010, P161. (04.03.2011) 
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103
 Daimler Annual Report 2010, P163.  
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105
 Daimler Annual Report 2010, P163.  
106
 Daimler Annual Report 2010, P160.  
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Ford Motors 
Ford’s Corporate Governance System compromises of Board of directors and 
Management, as figure 5.11 shows. The board of directors has 11 
independent directors and five committees107: (1) Audit, (2) Compensation, (3) 
Sustainability, (4) Finance, and (5) Nominating and Governance. The CEO 
and president are also on the board, which highlights a typical unitary board 
and outsider corporate governance structure. Typically “the Board of Directors 
monitors the performance of the CEO and senior management to assure that 
the long-term interests of the shareholders are being served”108. 
Figure 5.11 Ford Board-level Governance 
 
Source: Ford Board-level Governance (18.03.2011) 
 
TOYOTA MOTORS 
Toyota’s Corporate Governance System compromises of a Board of Directors, 
Management Officers and a non-board position of Managing Officers. The 
Board of Directors monitors Management Officers. In order to prompt decision 
making for developing global strategies and speeding up operations, the 
Senior Managing Directors serve as the highest authority of their specific 
operational functions and “as the link between management and on-site 
operations, instead of focusing exclusively on management”109, while non-
board Managing Officers implement the actual on-site operations. Moreover, 
there are in-house and external “committees and councils responsible for 
monitoring and discussing management and corporate activities from the 
                                                           
107
 Ford Corporate Governance Principles. 
108
 Ford Corporate Governance Principles. 
109
 Toyota Annual Report 2010, P24.  
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viewpoints of various stakeholders to ensure heightened transparency and the 
fulfilment of social obligations”110, as figure 5.12 illustrates.  
Figure 5.12 TOYOTA’s Corporate Governance Structure 
 
Source: Toyota Annual Report 2010, P25. (18.03.2011) 
 
 
 
5.4 Value-based Management and Economic Value Added 
 
According to their annual reports, all the firms selected in this case study 
emphasise that they are actively pursuing the enhancement of shareholders’ 
value. However, only the German firms are obliviously trying to incorporate 
financial performance indicators like Value Added into performance 
measurement system and value-based management into their operations. For 
example, Volkswagen uses the measuring system of Economic Value Added 
from Stern Stewart & Co.:  
“The Volkswagen Group’s financial target system centers on 
continuously and sustainably increasing the value of the Company. In 
order to use resources in the Automotive Division efficiently and to 
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measure the success of this, we have been using value contribution, a 
control variable linked to the cost of capital, for a number of 
years…Value contribution is calculated using operating profit after tax 
and the opportunity cost of invested capital.”111 
BMW Group is using Return On Capital Employed (ROCE) as the key 
performance indicator for Economic Value Added:  
“Taking into account the interests and rights of capital providers 
represents the basis for value-based management within the BMW 
Group. Only companies generating profits on a sustainable basis that 
exceed the cost of equity and debt capital employed are capable of 
ensuring continuous growth, an increase in value for capital providers, 
jobs and, in the final analysis, corporate independence. As part of the 
process of developing the Group’s management system, “economic 
value added” has been introduced at Group level as a new key 
performance indicator.  Value created represents a logical development 
of the method currently in use for managing the efficient use of capital 
based on the “return on capital employed”. 112  
As a typical accounting indicator, the “Return on Capital Employed” (ROCE) 
uses the “Net Operating Profit before Interest Expense and Tax” (NOPBIT), of 
which the measurement basis is the capital employed. However, the 
disadvantage of this method is that only the operating assets are taken into 
consideration. Although BMW uses the ROCE only for automobile and 
motorcycle sectors while using another indicator Return on Equity (ROE) for 
the performance measurement for financial service sector, the total ROCE on 
the group level cannot be taken as the Economic Value Added in the sense of 
economical “Rents”, which has been mentioned previously in this paper.  
Daimler AG is another typical group which is using Economic Value Added as 
the basis of its value-based management, as figure 5.13 illustrates.  
Figure 5.13 Value Added at Daimler AG 
 
Source: Daimler Annual Report 2010, P77. (04.03.2011) 
Key indicator of profit measurement at Daimler’s group level is the Net 
Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT):  
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 “The operational profit measure at divisional level is EBIT (earnings 
before interest and taxes) …The operational profit measure used at 
Group level is net operating profit. It comprises the EBIT of the 
divisions and profit and loss effects that the divisions are not held 
responsible for, including results from discontinued operations, income 
taxes and other reconciliation items”113.  
As for the invested capital, Daimler uses the concept of Net Assets at group 
level, which “include the net assets of the industrial divisions and the equity of 
Daimler Financial Services, as well as the net assets from discontinued 
operations, income taxes and other reconciliation items for which the divisions 
are not held accountable”114. This is a bit different from the definition of 
invested capital in the sense of standard Economic Value Added calculation. 
In the following calculation, this will be adjusted by using the typical invested 
capital, which equals total assets less current liabilities.  
Daimler also uses the standard Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
approach based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which 
“comprises the cost of equity as well as the costs of debt and pension 
obligations of the industrial business”115. 
In the following section, the Economic Value Added of the all selected 
companies from 2001-2010 will be calculated and analysed. All the 
accounting data comes originally from the corresponding companies’ annual 
reports from 2001 to 2010. The Economic Value Added (EVA) of different 
companies are then calculated according to the method provided in table 5.1. 
The individual results are illustrated in following figures 5.15 – 5.21. However 
the comparison of these results is not intended to make judgment on which 
corporate governance system is the best one.  
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Table 5.1 Template for Calculating Economic Value Added 
  
   Operating Income 
+ Interest income 
+ Equity income (or - equty loss) 
+ Other Investment Income 
-  Income taxes 
+ Tax shield on interest expense 
= Net Operating Profit After Tax (NOPAT) 
  
   Short-term debt 
+ Long-term debt (including bonds) 
+ Other long-term liabilities (deferred taxes and provisions) 
+ Shareholders' equity (including minority interest) 
= Invested Capital (IC) 
   Average IC = (ICbeg + ICend)/2 
Or  
  Total Assets  
- Short-term, non-interest-bearing liabilities (current liabilities) 
= Invested Capital (IC)                                                                                         
  
  NOPAT 
- Capital Charges (Average IC*WACC) 
= EVA 
Source: Yong & O'Byrne, 2001, P54-55. 
In conclusion, value based corporate governance systems are popular among 
the main automobile manufactures in German, Japan and USA. Japan 
automobile companies generally outperformance German and American 
ones, especially before the Economic Crisis of 2007-2010. GM and Ford have 
destroyed much value according to Economic Value Added schema, which is 
one of the reasons why American automobile firms nearly went to bankruptcy 
during the crisis. German automobile firms perform moderate and steady, and 
they are now marching for the position of best performers. However, 
according to the more rigid Economic Value Added calculation, there are still 
big potentials for at least the main players in global automobile industry to 
create more value for their shareholders. This paper maps the current value 
creating status in the automobile industry and hope that more and more 
companies can really find their real position and take actions to create more 
value for shareholders, and also the stakeholders. In anyway, the value based 
corporate governance is one good choice.  
 
Figure 5.14 Economic Value Added 
                                                          
116
 Exchange Rate: EURO/USD=1,33, based on the 2010 Monthly Average EURO/USD Exchange Rate according to 
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Figure 5.16 VW AG
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Figure 5.17 BMW Group
* Since the costs of capital of BMW Group from 2001 to 2007 are not directly available, I just take the average cost of 
capital of 2009 and 2010 as the standard WACC.
** Invested Capital = Equity + Non-curre
Liabilities  
Source: BMW Annual Report 2010, P49, P168
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Figure 5.18 GENERAL MO
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Figure 5.19 FORD MOTOR: Economic Value Added (EVA) (2001 
* NOPAT = Net income/ (loss) attributable to Ford Motor Company
** WACC of FORD not available in annual report.
http://www.editgrid.com/user/wikiwealth/Wiki_Wealth_Data
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equity (2001-2003), current liabilities are not available.
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Figure 5.20 TOYOTA
* NOPAT = Net Income (Loss) attributable to Toyota Motor Corporation
** WACC of Toyota, not available in annual 
http://www.editgrid.com/user/wikiwealth/Wiki_Wealth_Data
*** Invested Capital = Total liabilities and shareholders’ equity
Source: Toyota Annual Report 2010, P33, P61. (18.03.
Annual Report 2006, P128. (18.03.2011)
2003, P51. (18.03.2011); Toyota Annual Report 2001, P55
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Figure 5.21 HONDA MOTOR: Economic Value Added (EVA) (2001 
* NOPAT = Net income/ (loss) attributable to Honda Motor Company
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
The main topic of this paper is the analysis of the distribution of control rights, 
Economic Value Added and value based corporate governance. The main 
conclusions are:  
(1) the division of knowledge assets leads to the separation of ownership and 
control, which induces the agency problem;  
(2) based on the incomplete contract view and shareholder’s perspective, 
corporate governance is a complex set of constraints that shape the ex post 
bargaining over the residual claims and residual risk, which cannot be fully 
arranged in the initial contract but can be done by allocating residual control 
rights among the shareholders and management ex ante or contingently;  
(3) the main task of corporate governance is to align the managerial interests 
with those of shareholders and encourage the managers to create additional 
value.  
(4) Economic Value Added (EVA) can be used to control and measure value 
creation activities at project, department and firm levels;  
(5) different corporate governance systems have different roots in their unique 
economic, cultural, legal and political conditions, as well as their own evolution 
history, thus making it hard to compare which one is the best;  
(6) the case study of economic value added activities in the global automobile 
industry shows that many companies are using value based corporate 
governance systems, however there are still room for enhancing value 
creating capabilities;  
(7) In the sense of opportunity cost, Economic Value Added (EVA) approach 
try to cover all operating costs and all capital cost, which poses bigger 
challenge for managers. However, Economic Value Added can help 
managers to set higher value added targets when they make decisions on 
investment and other value-added activities.  
The case study is not in the position to illustrate a quantitative relationship 
between control rights, corporate governance and economic value added, 
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because the sample base is relatively small and some variants such as 
efficiency of corporate governance systems and culture differences are 
difficult to measure, which opens to further academic research.  
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Appendix 1 World Competitiveness Scoreboard 2010 
 
Source: the World Competitiveness Scoreboard 2010, (2010, 2011) 
http://www.imd.org/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf (09.01.2011) 
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Appendix 2 Global Competitiveness Index 2010–2011 (Top 60) 
 
Source: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 © 2010 World Economic Forum, (2010-2011, 2011) 
http://www.weforum.org/reports (09.01.2011) 
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Appendix 3 2010 Fortune Global 500 (Top 100) 
Rank Company 
Revenues Profits 
($ millions) ($ millions) 
1 Wal-Mart Stores 408,214 14,335 
2 Royal Dutch Shell 285,129 12,518 
3 Exxon Mobil 284,65 19,28 
4 BP 246,138 16,578 
5 Toyota Motor 204,106 2,256 
6 Japan Post Holdings 202,196 4,849 
7 Sinopec 187,518 5,756 
8 State Grid 184,496 -343 
9 AXA 175,257 5,012 
10 China National Petroleum 165,496 10,272 
11 Chevron 163,527 10,483 
12 ING Group 163,204 -1,3 
13 General Electric 156,779 11,025 
14 Total 155,887 11,741 
15 Bank of America Corp. 150,45 6,276 
16 Volkswagen 146,205 1,334 
17 ConocoPhillips  139,515 4,858 
18 BNP Paribas 130,708 8,106 
19 Assicurazioni Generali 126,012 1,82 
20 Allianz 125,999 5,973 
21 AT&T 123,018 12,535 
22 Carrefour 121,452 454 
23 Ford Motor 118,308 2,717 
24 ENI 117,235 6,07 
25 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 115,632 11,728 
26 Hewlett-Packard 114,552 7,66 
27 E.ON 113,849 11,67 
28 Berkshire Hathaway 112,493 8,055 
29 GDF Suez 111,069 6,223 
30 Daimler 109,7 -3,67 
31 Nippon Telegraph & Telephone 109,656 5,302 
32 Samsung Electronics 108,927 7,562 
33 Citigroup 108,785 -1,606 
34 McKesson 108,702 1,263 
35 Verizon Communications 107,808 3,651 
36 Crédit Agricole 106,538 1,564 
37 Banco Santander 106,345 12,43 
38 General Motors 104,589 -- 
39 HSBC Holdings  103,736 5,834 
40 Siemens 103,605 3,097 
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41 American International Group 103,189 -10,949 
42 Lloyds Banking Group 102,967 4,409 
43 Cardinal Health 99,613 1,152 
44 Nestlé 99,114 9,604 
45 CVS Caremark 98,729 3,696 
46 Wells Fargo 98,636 12,275 
47 Hitachi 96,593 -1,152 
48 International Business Machines  95,758 13,425 
49 Dexia Group 95,144 1,404 
50 Gazprom 94,472 24,556 
51 Honda Motor 92,4 2,891 
52 Électricité de France 92,204 5,428 
53 Aviva 92,14 1,692 
54 Petrobras 91,869 15,504 
55 Royal Bank of Scotland 91,767 -4,167 
56 PDVSA 91,182 1,608 
57 Metro 91,152 532 
58 Tesco 90,234 3,69 
59 Deutsche Telekom 89,794 491 
60 Enel 89,329 7,499 
61 UnitedHealth Group 87,138 3,822 
62 Société Générale 84,157 942 
63 Nissan Motor 80,963 456 
64 Pemex 80,722 -7,011 
65 Panasonic 79,893 -1,114 
66 Procter & Gamble 79,697 13,436 
67 LG 78,892 1,206 
68 Telefónica 78,853 10,808 
69 Sony 77,696 -439 
70 Kroger 76,733 70 
71 Groupe BPCE 76,464 746 
72 Prudential 75,01 1,054 
73 Munich Re Group 74,764 3,504 
74 Statoil 74 2,912 
75 Nippon Life Insurance 72,051 2,624 
76 AmerisourceBergen 71,789 503 
77 China Mobile Communications 71,749 11,656 
78 Hyundai Motor 71,678 2,33 
79 Costco Wholesale 71,422 1,086 
80 Vodafone 70,899 13,782 
81 BASF 70,461 1,96 
82 BMW 70,444 284 
83 Zurich Financial Services 70,272 3,215 
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84 Valero Energy 70,035 -1,982 
85 Fiat  69,639 -1,165 
86 Deutsche Post 69,427 895 
87 Industrial & Commercial Bank of China  69,295 18,832 
88 Archer Daniels Midland 69,207 1,707 
89 Toshiba 68,731 -213 
90 Legal & General Group 68,29 1,346 
91 Boeing 68,281 1,312 
92 U.S. Postal Service 68,09 -3,794 
93 Lukoil 68,025 7,011 
94 Peugeot 67,297 -1,614 
95 CNP Assurances 66,556 1,396 
96 Barclays 66,533 14,648 
97 Home Depot 66,176 2,661 
98 Target 65,357 2,488 
99 ArcelorMittal 65,11 118 
100 WellPoint 65,028 4,746 
 
Source: Fortune Magazine, 2011. 2010 Global 500 (Top 100). (09.01.2011) 
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Appendix 4 2011 World’s Most Admired Companies 
 
Full List   Industries: Motor Vehicals 
Rank Company   Rank Company Overall score 
1 Apple    1 BMW 6,88 
2 Google   2 Volkswagen 5,33 
3 Berkshire Hathaway   3 Daimler 4,83 
4 Southwest Airlines   4 Hyundai Motor 4,68 
5 Procter & Gamble   5 Honda Motor 4,37 
6 Coca-Cola   6 Ford Motor 4,36 
7 Amazon.com   7 Toyota Motor 4,26 
8 FedEx   8 Nissan Motor 3,86 
9 Microsoft   9   General Motors  3,75 
10 McDonald's   10   Renault  3,59 
11 Wal-Mart Stores   11   Fiat  3,51 
12 IBM   12   Peugeot  3,47 
13 General Electric   13   Volvo  3,20 
14 Walt Disney   14   ShanghaiAutomotive  3,10 
15 3M   15   Dongfeng Motor  2,78 
16 Starbucks         
17 Johnson & Johnson         
18 Singapore Airlines         
19 BMW         
20 American Express         
21 Nordstrom         
22 Target         
23 J.P. Morgan Chase         
24 Nike         
25 Goldman Sachs Group         
26 PepsiCo         
27 Caterpillar         
28 Cisco Systems         
29 Costco Wholesale         
30 UPS         
31 Nestlé         
32 Intel         
33 Toyota Motor         
34 Exxon Mobil         
35 Volkswagen         
36 Best Buy         
37 Marriott International         
38 Samsung Electronics         
39 Deere         
40 Netflix         
41 Wells Fargo         
42 Honda Motor       
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43 DuPont         
44 Yum Brands         
45 eBay         
46 Sony         
47 General Mills         
48 Oracle         
49* Accenture         
49* Lowe's         
 
* For the 50 most admired companies overall, FORTUNE's survey asked businesspeople to vote for the companies 
that they admired most, from any industry. 
Source: 
Fortune Magazine, 2011) World’s most admired companies. 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/2011/full_list/ (15.03.2010) 
 Industries: Motor Vehicals.  http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/mostadmired/2011/industries/39.html 
(15.03.2011) 
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